We develop a three-level hierarchy of privacy notions for (unforgeable) digital signature schemes. We first prove mutual independence of existing notions of anonymity and confidentiality, and then show that these are implied by higher privacy goals. The top notion in our hierarchy is pseudorandomness: signatures with this property hide the entire information about the signing process and cannot be recognized as signatures when transmitted over a public network. This implies very strong unlinkability guarantees across different signers and even different signing algorithms, and gives rise to new forms of private public-key authentication.
INTRODUCTION
A digital signature σ on a message m is generated using a private key sk and is verified in respect to the corresponding public key pk. Digital signatures shall be unforgeable and offer authenticity of signers and integrity of signed messages. In the 90's, however, with the advent of public key infrastructures (PKIs), digital signatures were criticized for being a threat to user's privacy [20] . For instance, with system-wide known (PKI-certified) public keys, and due to the public verifiability of signatures, any transmission of (m, σ) over a public network such as the Internet implicitly reveals to all intermediate parties the identity of the signer, i.e. owner of (certified) pk -and not only to the intended recipients/verifiers. Considering public availability of both σ and pk, we can hope to obtain privacy only by restricting the amount of publicly available information about message m. Indeed, messages might be delivered through a different communication channel (e.g. in an online banking scenario with two-factor authentication) or at some earlier or later point in time (e.g. in anonymous auctions), and thus still remain out of reach of the adversary that obtains signatures and public keys. Further on, verifiers might expect signatures on messages that need not be transmitted at all: for example, private outputs computed with secure multi-party computation techniques or in (anonymous) key exchange protocols can be viewed as messages for which parties may wish to exchange signatures.
Current Privacy Notions and Open Issues. Privacy of digital signatures, where signatures σ are revealed but associated messages m are not disclosed, has found attention in definitions and security models of anonymous signatures by Yang et al. [29] and Fischlin [17] , and in the notion of confidential signatures by Dent et al. [16] . These schemes aim at either hiding the identities/public keys of signers (anonymity) or the content of signed messages (confidentiality). Both privacy notions were defined for highentropy message spaces, which is a necessary requirement, presuming the system-wide knowledge of public keys and signatures. This conceptual similarity raises a question on the possible relationship between anonymity and confidentiality, and triggers interest in a deeper study on the limits of privacy achievable with traditional signature schemes: Are there schemes whose signatures σ hide signer's identity/public key and simultaneously keep signed messages secret? What are the differences between deterministic and probabilistic schemes in terms of these goals? Is the prop-erty of 'message recovery' damaging for privacy? Answers to these questions would clarify the relationship among the existing notions of privacy for signature schemes, shed light on their privacy-enabling properties, and possibly pave the way for more sophisticated privacy guarantees. We give answers to many such questions.
Pseudorandom Signatures and Applications. In fact, the most interesting question in respect to privacy of signature schemes is whether signatures can look (to observers) completely random. On the one hand, this property would repel attention of intermediate parties, possibly performing traffic analysis, to the transmission of signatures. Those parties could not learn whether a given datagram represents something potentially valuable (in this case a signature) or not. On the other hand, and more importantly, signatures that cannot be distinguished from random strings (of some fixed length) also hide which signing algorithm its signer was using -this knowledge alone is often sufficient to identify signers (even if the signature scheme itself is anonymous).
We give some examples where signers, or groups of signers, naturally use different parameters settings for (potentially) the same signing algorithm.
For instance, in the new European travel documents, the selection of specific (elliptic curve) parameters is the priority of respective states [9] . Many banks and health insurance companies issue smart cards to their customers, initialized with different signing algorithms and parameters. We observe that distinguishing among different settings, implementations, or instantiations of the same signature scheme S can be seen as a privacy problem, e.g. if signatures can be used to derive which citizenship or which customer relationship to which bank or insurance company the signer has. Now assume that different signature schemes S1, S2, . . . (unforgeable, possibly under different hardness assumptions or with varying levels of security) output signatures σ1, σ2, . . ., respectively, of fixed length L. If all these signatures looked random to observers, then σi would hide the applied scheme Si, i.e. only the possession of m and (the expected signer's) pk would allow to verify σi. In contrast, any other party (even with knowledge of the keys of the whole system) would remain totally clueless whether σi represents a signature or not, and, if so, which signing algorithm was used.
Furthermore, pseudorandom signatures give rise to covert public-key authentication, offering cryptographic protection to covert channels, i.e. channels that appear random to any entity other than the communication partner (as defined, e.g. in [10, 21, 28] ). With pseudorandom signatures, it would be possible to perform public-key authentication and execute authenticated key exchange over covert channels without loosing covertness. For example, parties could first run an unauthenticated key exchange protocol that has randomlooking messages (those can easily be constructed using the Diffie-Hellman approach in various groups based on techniques used in our work (cf. Lemma 13)) and then exchange pseudorandom signatures on the protocol transcript and an additional high-entropy confirmation token derived from the established shared key material. Since all exchanged messages are random-looking, the established secure channel between the two mutually authenticated parties would remain covert. Moreover, if pseudorandomness of signatures can be preserved even in the unfortunate case where the signing key sk is leaked, then the above protocol would guaran- Notation: X → Y means that X is a strictly stronger privacy notion than Y . X Y means that X does not imply Y . X-FKE stands for X defined with of full key exposure.
tee 'forward covertness' (akin to forward secrecy, e.g. [13] ). More generally, pseudorandom signatures seem to offer very strong and useful privacy guarantees in communication protocols and applications where authentication should remain unobservable by traffic analysis [23] .
Our Results and Techniques

Privacy Hierarchy for Digital Signatures
We develop a three-level hierarchy of privacy notions for digital signatures, starting our work with the investigation of the relationship between anonymity and confidentiality, two previously established privacy notions for signatures. Definitions of anonymity were first given by Yang et al. [29] , with later refinements by Fischlin [17] . These definitions presume messages with high entropy (unlike Bellare and Duan [2] and Saraswat and Yun [25] , who regard a more restrictive form of signatures 1 ). For confidentiality, we use the original definitions by Dent et al. [16] (in its strongest variant). We show that anonymous signatures and confidential signatures are independent privacy notions 2 . For this reason, anonymity (ANON) and confidentiality (CONF) are located at the lowest level of our privacy hierarchy.
At the mid-level of our hierarchy we have indistinguishability (IND), expressing that signatures can be simulated from the public parameters of the scheme. We prove that such signatures offer stronger privacy guarantees than purely anonymous and purely confidential schemes. In particular, any transmission of an IND signature simultaneously hides both the signer and the associated message. The IND prop-1 Anonymity definitions in [2, 25] assume that σ consists of two parts -signature σ1 and a value σ2 (called deanonymizer in [2] or verification token in [25] ), both of which are needed to perform the verification. Transmission of the entire σ = (σ1, σ2), that is amenable to verification, becomes a two-stage process, with σ1 (together with m) being disclosed in the first stage, and σ2 in the second stage. Anonymity of the signer is then defined with respect to an adversary that knows σ1 but not σ2. As discussed in [2, 25] , this definition essentially implies anonymity from [17, 29] , allowing also low-entropy message spaces. Since we look on privacy from a more general perspective (e.g. consider confidentiality as another privacy goal), it appears more advisable to work with high-entropy messages and use conceptually simpler anonymity definitions from [17, 29] . 2 Interestingly, Dent et al. [16] mention similarities between the notions but do not formally investigate their relationship. They only expect it to be similar to the relationship between anonymous (key-private) encryption schemes [1] and traditional public-key encryption schemes. Arguably, these notions do not seem to be independent, unless anonymous encryption schemes that do not offer secrecy of encrypted messages are interesting on their own. erty is thus a generalization of both ANON and CONF and is sufficient for obtaining privacy in anticipated applications of both schemes. IND signatures may, however, leak some recognizable structure about the signature scheme in use.
The strongest privacy notion in our arsenal lets signatures appear to privacy adversaries as (structureless) strings of random bits, and is hence termed pseudorandom (PR). We show why this property is sufficient to hide all information about the signing process, including the signature scheme itself. The introduced privacy hierarchy with the intuitively strongest notion of pseudorandomness on top is thus likely to close the subject of privacy-preserving signatures.
Each of our privacy notions is defined in two variants, reflecting that adversaries might of might not have a copy of the signing key. That is, we also address security with full key exposure (FKE), which has been formalized for anonymous schemes by Fischlin [17] (and is also considered in [2, 25] , but did not find formal treatment in the definitions of confidentiality in [16] ).
The universe of privacy notions considered in this paper and their relationships is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Constructions and Transformations
For a selection of existing signature schemes, we investigate indistinguishability and pseudorandomness properties and, where appropriate, propose modifications and generic transformations to achieve these goals. We build privacypreserving signatures in three different cryptographic settings, namely using RSA parameters on the example of the full-domain hash RSA (FDH-RSA) scheme [4] , using cyclic prime-order groups on the example of Schnorr's scheme [26] , and using pairings on the example of the Boneh-Boyen (BB) scheme [5] . These results are summarized in Table 1 and detailed in the following.
Indistinguishable Signatures. We formalize the notion of information recovering signatures (as a generalization of the known concept of 'message recovery') and discuss its negative impact on confidentiality, and hence on indistinguishability and pseudorandomness. We show that not only known message recovering schemes (e.g. 'text-book' RSA and Nyberg-Rueppel [22] , together with their 'hash-thensign'-based transformations), but also several other schemes (in different cryptographic contexts) fall under our more general notion of 'information recovery' and thus do not offer indistinguishability. Examples include schemes by Cramer and Shoup (CS) [15] , Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL) [11] , and Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham (BLS) [7] . That is, signatures in these schemes leak information even if they do not allow full recovery of signed messages.
We then focus on three cryptographic settings -RSA, discrete logarithms (DL), and pairings -and provide examples of indistinguishable schemes. In particular, we show that, using appropriate randomization and padding techniques, FDH-RSA becomes indistinguishable. In DL setting we prove that the (generalized) signature scheme by Schnorr [26] offers indistinguishability 'off the shelf', yet assuming that its cyclic group is shared among all signers. We notice that anonymity of FDH-RSA and Schnorr's schemes was previously analyzed in [29] , their confidentiality in [16] . Our analysis essentially shows that both schemes admit much stronger privacy guarantees. Finally, we prove that the pairing-based Boneh-Boyen (BB) [5] scheme is indistinguishable in the standard model, yet for uniformly distributed (fixed-length) messages only. As suggested in [5] , the 'hash-then-sign' approach can be used in standard model to sign longer messages. We show that in the random oracle model this method readily offers indistinguishability for arbitrary long high-entropy messages. We note that indistinguishability of all analyzed schemes holds in the presence of full key exposure (FKE). Bottom line, we show existence of IND schemes in different cryptographic settings, paving the way towards pseudorandom signature schemes (based on different hardness assumptions).
Pseudorandom Signatures. PR signatures, which cannot be distinguished from random bit strings of the same length, offer the highest form of privacy that signatures can provide.
Our first result on PR signatures is a generic transformation that strengthens IND signatures to obtain the PR property (we call it IND-to-PR compiler in Table 1 ). It uses admissible encodings, introduced in a different context by Boneh and Franklin [6] for elliptic curves, generalized later by Brier et al. [8] , and also used to preserve privacy in the password-based authentication protocol by Bringer, Chabanne and Icart [9] (we thus show another interesting application of this primitive). By finding appropriate admissible encodings for different types of sets, we can immediately obtain the PR property for the IND versions of FDH-RSA, Schnorr, and BB schemes. We also prove that the obtained PR property holds in the presence of full key exposure.
Our next result is a second generic transformation that achieves the PR property directly for any (unforgeable) digital signature scheme. This PR compiler is powerful enough to guarantee the PR property also for information recovering schemes and works irrespective of whether the original scheme is probabilistic or deterministic. Moreover, the PR property is guaranteed even if secret signing keys are exposed (FKE). This compiler uses randomness extractors and its techniques have been previously developed by Fischlin [17] to construct anonymous signatures. We thus prove formally that Fischlin's anonymous signature admits a general transformation, which is strong enough to convert any unforgeable signature scheme into a scheme satisfying the strongest 3 privacy property. This direct PR compiler, however, is slightly less efficient than our IND-to-PR compiler.
Related Work on Signature Privacy
Anonymity of signers assuming high-entropy messages was initially defined by Yang et al. [29] , who analyzed anonymity of 'text-book' RSA, PSS, and Schnorr signatures, after applying some necessary modifications. Their definition was simplified by Fischlin [17] (and relaxed to full key exposure), who showed how to obtain anonymity using randomness extractors. Anonymity definitions for arbitrary messages, yet with specific restrictions on the format of disclosed signatures, were formulated independently by Bellare and Duan [2] , Saraswat and Yun [25] , and Zhang and Imai [30] . Using the 'sign-then-commit' approach, Bellare and Duan [2] gave four constructions: Their first scheme (also presented in [25] ) uses commitments as black-box to produce anonymous signatures in the standard model. The second scheme uses randomized hash functions and can be applied to deterministic signature schemes. Their third solution relies on deterministic hash functions and can be used with probabilistic signature schemes. The fourth scheme from [2] , termed 'splitting construction' follows closely the design of Schnorr signatures in the discrete logarithm setting. Saraswat and Yun [25] proved anonymity of the signature scheme by Boneh and Boyen [5] . Furthermore, both [2] and [25] formalize another requirement (called unambiguity in [2] and unpretendability in [25] ) that prevents the adversary from claiming the ownership of an anonymous signature at a later stage. Note that this requirement is orthogonal to privacy and can be handled separately. The anonymous scheme by Zhang and Imai [30] uses what they call 'collision-resistant exposurefree functions' which are instantiated with randomized hash functions in the random oracle model. Confidentiality of signature schemes has been considered so far formally by Dent et al. [16] for messages with high entropy, inspired by the definitional treatment of confidentiality for deterministic public-key encryption [3] . They defined three flavors (weak, mezzo, and strong) with increasing strength and addressed both deterministic and probabilistic schemes (without full key exposure). Confidentiality of several schemes used in practice was analyzed as well, including those that use fulldomain hash constructions (for which [16] defined confidentiality of hash functions, following earlier ideas from [12] ), those obtained from Fiat-Shamir transformation, and those based on randomness extractors. Manifold solutions for obtaining privacy were also proposed with more advanced signing techniques. For example, in group signatures [14] , users obtain membership certificates from the manager of a group and issue signatures that identify the signer as a valid group member without revealing its actual identity. The latter can be recovered from the signature only by the group manager. Ring signatures [24] allow the signer to form 'ad-hoc' groups and so hide its own identity (in an unrevocable way) from a potential verifier, who only learns that the signer belongs to the formed group. As discussed in [17] , ring signatures differ substantially from anonymous signatures as, in the former, anonymity is bound to a (presumably small) group, and in the latter it is guaranteed as long as some information needed for the public verification of signatures remains secret. Anonymity notions have also been considered for other signature types, e.g. undeniable and confirmer signatures by tion was not yet defined. Our hierarchy clarifies his intuition formally and further implies indistinguishability and confidentiality of his scheme (in presence of full key exposure). Galbraith and Mao [19] ; as discussed in [25] , these notions differ from anonymity in ordinary signature schemes.
PREVIOUS PRIVACY NOTIONS
We recall the syntax of digital signatures in Definition 1. Note that all schemes used in this work are also unforgeable (cf. Appendix A). We focus on privacy of probabilistic 4 schemes in a setting with system-wide known public keys.
Definition 1 (Digital Signature Scheme). A digital signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign, Ver) is given by three algorithms: The key generation algorithm KGen, on input security parameter 1 λ , generates a key pair (sk, pk) ← KGen (1 λ ), the signing algorithm Sign, on input a secret key sk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , outputs a signature σ ← Sign(sk, m), and the (deterministic) verification algorithm Ver, on input a public key pk, a message m, and a candidate signature σ, outputs a bit d ← Ver(pk, m, σ). The scheme S is correct if for all λ ∈ N, (sk, pk) ← KGen(1 λ ), m ∈ {0, 1} * , and σ ← Sign(sk, m), we have Ver(pk, m, σ) = 1. The scheme S is deterministic if every two invocations of Sign(sk, ·) on the same input message m result in the same signature σ.
Anonymous Signatures
Anonymity of signatures for high-entropy messages [17, 29] hides which signer (presuming the system-wide knowledge of public keys) generated a given challenge signature σ. Definition 2 is essentially from [17] , where we also let the adversary A choose the challenge message m (similar to [2] ). In case of full key exposure, A receives secret keys, which obsoletes the signing oracle. 
if t = t0 then output 1, else output 0 Figure 3 : Confidentiality Experiments (without and with Full Key Exposure).
is negligible in λ, assuming that A1 is provided with all admissible inputs and oracles as specified in the respective anonymity experiment. The minimum entropy of A is then given by − log 2 µ(λ).
Confidential Signatures
Confidentiality of digital signatures, formalized by Dent et al. in [16] , hides information about the message m that was signed. Definition 3 corresponds to strong confidentiality from [16] , the strongest among the three notions (weak, mezzo, strong) proposed there. 
] is negligible in λ, assuming A1 is provided with all admissible inputs and oracles as specified in the resp. confidentiality experiment. The minimum entropy of A is then given by − log 2 µ(λ).
Observe that, in the confidentiality experiments from Figure 3 , the first-stage adversary A1 outputs a vector m of messages, each of high entropy, and an additional token t. This token models the intuition that confidential signatures shouldn't leak 'any information' about signed messages. * and | m| denotes the number of elements in m. Accordingly, by σ ← Sign(sk, m) we denote the process of signing the messages in m element-wise and independently of each other, resulting in a vector σ of corresponding signatures. 6 We stick here to the confidentiality definition introduced by Dent et al. in [16] using two separate calls of A1.
anonymous nor confidential and that for other schemes both notions hold simultaneously (cf. Section 4).
Lemma 1 (CONF[-FKE] ⇒ ANON).
Confidential signature schemes (with full key exposure) are not necessarily anonymous.
Lemma 2 (ANON[-FKE] ⇒ CONF).
Anonymous signature schemes (with full key exposure) are not necessarily confidential.
DIGITAL SIGNATURES WITH INFOR-MATION RECOVERY
The following definition of 'information recovery', where in the verification procedure signer's public key is used together with the signature to compute some information that is then compared to information determined by the public key and the message, generalizes the known concept of 'message recovery'.
Definition 4 (Information Recovering Signatures
Remark 1. Note that information recovering signature schemes with Inf(pk, ·) = pk = Rec(pk, ·) might be correct, but are necessarily forgeable. More precisely, if Inf(pk, m0) = Inf(pk, m1) happens with noticeable probability (for independently drawn m0, m1 ∈R {0, 1} λ ), an adversary A against unforgeability can be constructed by letting A request a signature σ0 on a random message m0 and output (m1, σ0), for random m1, as a forgery. To see that A has non-negligible success probability, observe that σ0 will verify successfully for m1 if we have Rec(pk, σ0) = Inf(pk, m1) = Inf(pk, m0), what happens with non-negligible probability by assumption.
Examples of Schemes with Information Recovery.
Classical examples of information recovering schemes include "text-book" RSA and Nyberg-Rueppel [22] , whose signatures can be used to recover messages. Observe that if the "hash-then-sign" approach is used, e.g. FDH-RSA [4] , then signatures computed on hash values H(m) (rather than on messages m) are still information recovering, even if H is modeled as a random oracle, i.e. the corresponding algorithm Inf(pk, m) would simply output H(m). This property can also be found amongst signature schemes that are not message recovering or where messages need not be hashed to compute (unforgeable) signatures (as shown in Appendix C).
Information Recovery Limits Privacy. The property of information recovery of a scheme can be immediately used to break the scheme's confidentiality by including information derived via algorithm Inf from messages in m into t, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. There is no unforgeable information recovering signature scheme that provides confidentiality.
Proof. Let S = (KGen, Sign, Ver) be an information recovering signature scheme. Consider the following adversary A = (A1, A2) against confidentiality of S: A1 on input pk picks a random λ-bit message m, computes t ← 
INDISTINGUISHABLE SIGNATURES
The independence of the notions of anonymity and confidentiality of digital signature schemes places these concepts at the bottom level of our privacy hierarchy and puts forward the question on the existence of a more general privacy property that implies both of them. We call this property indistinguishability and formalize it in Definition 5. We use a simulation-based approach, following the intuition that anonymity and confidentiality are implied if all information that can be extracted from a real signature can also be extracted from a 'signature' that was simulated without knowledge of keys and messages. Figure 4 , and where the following high entropy constraint holds: The function µ(λ) = max M ∈{0,1} * Pr[M ∈ m : ( m, t) ← A1] is negligible in λ, assuming A1 is provided with all admissible inputs and oracles as specified in the resp. indistinguishability experiment. The minimum entropy of A is given by − log 2 µ(λ).
Lemmas 4 and 5, proven in Appendix D, confirm the intuition that indistinguishable signatures are also anonymous and confidential (even in presence of full key exposure).
Lemma 4 (IND ⇒ ANON, IND-FKE ⇒ ANON-FKE).
Every indistinguishable signature scheme is anonymous. The same implication holds in presence of full key exposure.
Lemma 5 (IND ⇒ CONF, IND-FKE ⇒ CONF-FKE).
Every indistinguishable signature scheme is confidential. The same implication holds in presence of full key exposure. 7 Since our IND definition involves a simulator Sim that generates signatures in σ without knowledge of (sk, m), one may ask about the relationship to zero-knowledge proofs, which also, by definition, are simulatable without knowledge of the secret. We observe that indistinguishable signatures are not zero-knowledge proofs -simulated IND signatures need not to be convincing (as opposed to simulated proofs), i.e. they do not need to pass the regular signature verification.
if t = t then output 1, else output 0 
Techniques and Examples
We now exemplify IND constructions using three known signature schemes: FDH-RSA [4] , Schnorr [26] , and BonehBoyen [5] . That is, we show that indistinguishable schemes can be obtained in different cryptographic setting, i.e. RSA, discrete logarithms (DL), and pairings. We notice that our techniques can be applied to many existing schemes that either fulfill this privacy notion directly or can be slightly modified to become indistinguishable.
RSA-based Construction
On the example of FDH-RSA [4] , which is neither confidential nor anonymous, we demonstrate two techniques to obtain indistinguishability. First, we apply a randomized hash [2] , where a message m is hashed together with some randomness r, which is chosen within the signing procedure. The hash value H(m, r) is then used in the signing algorithm (instead of m), and r is appended to the resulting signature. This method eliminates information recovery since the output of Inf(pk, m) depends now on H(m, r) (and not only on m), and the probability that the first stage IND adversary learns information about H(m, r) is negligible (given that r is sufficiently long and chosen in the challenge phase). We can then apply padding to hide the length of signature components that are elements of ZN , and by this protect anonymity [29] . These methods turn out to be sufficient for the indistinguishability of the scheme.
Randomized FDH-RSA with Padding. Let GenRSA(1 λ ) denote an algorithm that outputs tuples (N, e, d) where N is an RSA modulus, i.e. N = pq for two prime numbers p and q of length λ/2, and e, d ∈ Z Lemma 6. The probabilistic FDH-RSA scheme with padding is indistinguishable with full key exposure, in the random oracle model.
Proof. We will consider the simulator Sim that, on input security parameter 1 λ and message number , outputs a vector of integers in [0, Z λ − 1], drawn uniformly at random. Let A = (A1, A2) be any indistinguishability adversary against the modified FDH-RSA scheme. Consider experiments Exp Let Exp be the experiment which is like Exp IND,0,j FDH-RSA,Sim,A (λ) except that, in the generation of the (j + 1)th signature of σ * , we replace the output of hash function HN by a value h ∈R ZN , picked uniformly at random (or, equivalently, we use the value h d , for h ∈R ZN ). By the Random Oracle Model, this change can only be detected by adversaries that correctly guess both: message m and randomizer r. But this will happen only with negligible probability, since A1 would have to guess r ∈ {0, 1} λ , and A2 would have to guess m, which has large entropy. Consider now the hop to experiment Exp 
DL and Pairing-Based Constructions
We now move to the DL and pairing-based settings and focus on the signature schemes by Schnorr [26] and by Boneh and Boyen [5] , respectively. Schnorr Signature Scheme. Let G = g be a cyclic group of prime order q, where |q| = λ, and H : {0, 1} * → Zq be a hash function modeled as random oracle. Schnorr's signature scheme is specified as follows.
SCH.Sign(sk, m) : Choose r ∈R Zq. In the indistinguishability analysis (akin to prior work on anonymity and confidentiality of the scheme [16, 29] ) we assume that all signers use the same group G. ) except that, in the generation of the (j + 1)th signature of σ * , we replace the output of hash function H by a value c ∈R Zq, picked uniformly at random. By the Random Oracle Model, this change can only be detected by adversaries that correctly guess both: group element g r and message m. This will happen only with negligible probability, since A1 would have to guess g r (with success probability
, and A2 would have to guess m, which has large entropy. Note that c is now independent of r, i.e., in the calculation of s := sk · c + r, variable r acts like a one-time pad on sk · c. It follows that also s can be replaced by a uniformly random value s ∈R Zq, without A noticing it. We have just shown that |Pr[Exp 
Boneh-Boyen Signature Scheme.
The signature scheme by Boneh and Boyen [5] based on pairings works over cyclic groups G1, G2, GT of prime order q (with |q| = λ) for which an efficient bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT is known. Let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and G2, respectively. The scheme is specified for message space Zq as follows. Lemma 8. The "hash-then-sign" version of the signature scheme by Boneh and Boyen is indistinguishable with full key exposure, in the random oracle model.
We first prove that this construction is indistinguishable (in the standard model), yet for uniform message distributions only, and then generalize this result to arbitrary distributions in {0, 1} * (in the random oracle model). In order to prove Lemma 8 we first prove the following lemma (which holds in the standard model).
Lemma 9. Signature scheme BB is (perfectly) indistinguishable with respect to full key exposure, for uniformly distributed messages.
Proof. Consider the following simulator Sim: On input security parameter 1 λ and message number , Sim independently samples random pairs (σ , r) ∈R (G1 \ {1}) × Zq. Let A = (A1, A2) be any indistinguishability adversary against the BB signature scheme such that A1 outputs uniformly distributed messages in Zq. Denote by Exp } and range G1 \ {1}. Basically, this is due to the fact that Zq is a finite field, in which all elements but zero can be multiplicatively inverted. It follows that, if r is picked uniformly at random from the given domain, then r acts like a one-time pad on m and makes σ uniformly distributed, in A1's eyes. The analog holds for A2: This time, it is uniformly distributed message m that makes σ look uniform. This shows that Pr[Exp In general, digital signature schemes are expected to support arbitrary message spaces, i.e. messages m ∈ {0, 1} * . As pointed out by Boneh and Boyen [5] , their scheme can be converted into an unforgeable signature scheme for arbitrary long messages by using the "hash-then-sign" approach, for a suitable hash function H : {0, 1} * → Zq. Such 'hybrid' version of BB can still be proven unforgeable in the standard model, as the only condition posed on H is that of collisionresistance. If, on the other hand, the hash function H is additionally modeled as a random oracle (that smoothes the entropy in the message space to a uniform distribution) the proof of Lemma 8 follows directly from Lemma 9.
PSEUDORANDOM SIGNATURES
Although indistinguishability is already a strong privacy notion it still has one important limitation: The simulator Sim used to define the IND property depends on the signature scheme S; in particular, it simulates signatures using public parameters of S. Although both the signer and the message are successfully hidden in IND signatures, the very scheme that was used to create a given signature might not be, e.g. IND signatures may have characteristic lengths or follow specific formats, like element representation of the components of Schnorr signatures, and so on. In practice, usage of some S in an application or network protocol can be prescribed via standards. However, instantiations with concrete parameters (e.g. prime modulus p in a Schnorr group G ⊆ Z × p ) is often left unspecified. Different parameter choices may introduce a unique pattern that can be (mis)used to distinguish among the signing algorithms and by this obtain more information about signers and about the context in which the signatures were produced.
We address this limitation in Definition 6 with the property of pseudorandomness, where we require that signatures output by S are indistinguishable from randomly chosen binary strings of length L(λ) = L S (λ). This simpler definition
if t = t then output 1, else output 0 is sufficient to obtain pseudorandom signatures of some fixed length L * , viewed as a global upper bound on the individual lengths L S (λ) for all signature schemes S in the system, using a simple padding with random bits. That is, all signatures in the system would be L * bits long and look completely random, no matter how they were produced. It would hence become impossible, for some given signature σ to derive any information about the scheme S that was used to generate it. This seems to be the highest level of privacy that can be offered by a signature scheme. (λ), b ∈ {0, 1}, are the pseudorandomness experiments from Figure 5 , and where the following high entropy constraint holds: The function µ(λ) = max M ∈{0,1} * Pr[M ∈ m : ( m, t) ← A1] is negligible in λ, assuming that A1 is provided with all admissible inputs and oracles as specified in the respective pseudorandomness experiment. The minimum entropy of A is then given by − log 2 µ(λ).
Definition 6 (Pseudorandom Signatures
Pseudorandomness is as a special case of indistinguishability, where simulator Sim draws at random from {0, 1} L(λ) . However, PR is strictly stronger than IND, i.e. Lemmas 10 and 11, proven in Appendix E, settle the PR notion at the top of the privacy hierarchy:
Lemma 10 (PR ⇒ IND, PR-FKE ⇒ IND-FKE). Every pseudorandom signature scheme is indistinguishable. The same implication holds with full key exposure.
Lemma 11 (IND[-FKE] ⇒ PR)
. Indistinguishable signature schemes (with full key exposure) are not necessarily pseudorandom. 8 We denote by σ ∈R {0, 1}
L×| m| the process of picking | m| strings independently at random from {0, 1}
L . We comprehend L(λ) as the fixed length of signatures conforming to security level λ.
Two Pseudorandomness Compilers
We present two compilers for pseudorandomness of digital signatures. Our first compiler assumes that the underlying scheme is indistinguishable (with some additional constraints), while our second compiler offers pseudorandomness for arbitrary (unforgeable) signature schemes. Both transformations work without random oracles.
IND-to-PR Compiler: From Indistinguishability to Pseudorandomness
Our IND-to-PR compiler converts any indistinguishable signature scheme into a pseudorandom one. This is done by considering the different elements that form the signature component-wise (e.g., in case of Schnorr signatures, the elements c ∈ Zq and s ∈ Zq), and encoding them as binary strings via appropriate admissible encodings. Resulting strings are concatenated to obtain the pseudorandom signature. The concept of admissible encodings was created for the main purpose of hashing into elliptic curves in the IBE scheme of Boneh and Franklin [6] . Their definition was later generalized to arbitrary sets by Brier et al. [8] , and used recently in the construction of a privacy-preserving authentication protocol by Bringer, Chabanne and Icart [9] .
Definition 7 (Admissible Encoding [8] ). Let S, R denote finite sets with |S| > |R|. A function F : S → R is called -admissible encoding for (S, R) if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Computable: F is computable in deterministic polynomial time.
2. Invertible: There exists a PPT algorithm IF such that IF (r) ∈ F −1 (r) ∪ {⊥} for all r ∈ R, and for r uniformly distributed in R the distribution of IF (r) isstatistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution in S.
If is a negligible function of the security parameter then F is called an admissible encoding.
Intuitively, an admissible encoding F : S → R shifts the process of picking elements uniformly at random in S to the process of picking elements uniformly at random in R, and vice versa. Not surprisingly, the following aggregation lemma holds.
Lemma 12 (Aggregation of Admissible Encodings).
Let S = S1 × . . . × Sn and R = R1 × . . . × Rn denote Cartesian products of finite sets. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Fi : Si → Ri denote an i-admissible encoding. Then F : S → R; (s1, . . . , sn) → (F1(s1) , . . . , Fn(sn)) is anadmissible encoding, for = n i=1 i.
In our compiler, we will use admissible encodings F : S → R, where S = {0, 1} L(λ) and R is the 'signature space' of the scheme. Note that w. l. o. g. it would even suffice to have S = {0, 1} for < L(λ) as we can always pad 9 with L(λ)− random bits at the end in IF , and ignore the last L(λ) − bits when evaluating F . Thus, if σ is indistinguishable then 9 Such pad/ignore steps can also be seen as the aggregation of F with the canonical admissible encoding for {0, 1} L(λ)− → {0, 1} 0 (where {0, 1} 0 denotes the language that contains only the empty word).
L(λ) is pseudorandom. This admissible encoding-based compiler works as follows, where the input signature scheme S is assumed to be indistinguishable with a regular simulator and (F, IF ) denotes an appropriate admissible encoding that maps strings in {0, 1} L(λ) into the signature space.
AEC.Ver(pk, m, σ ) : Let σ ← F (σ ). Output S.Ver(pk, m, σ).
The pseudorandomness of the resulting scheme AEC is proven in Theorem 1. This proof requires the following notion of regular simulators that can be found in our proofs of IND signature schemes from Section 4.1 and exist for many other schemes.
Definition 8 (Regular Simulators). A simulator
Sim in the indistinguishability experiment (cf. Figure 4) is called regular if it samples uniformly at random from the 'signature space' S(λ), i.e. the range of the Sign algorithm. That is, for regular simulators Sim, running σ * ← Sim(1 λ , ) and σ * ∈R S(λ) are identical.
If S is an indistinguishable signature scheme with a regular simulator Sim and F is an -admissible encoding that maps {0, 1} L(λ) into the signature space of S then the AEC signature scheme, obtained via IND-to-PR compiler, is pseudorandom.
Proof. Let A = (A1, A2) be any pseudorandomness adversary against AEC signature scheme. Denote by Exp the experiment that is like Exp AEC,A (λ) = Exp for some polynomially bounded by λ. As Sim is regular, the distribution of IF (Sim(1 λ , 1)) is -close to the uniform distribution over {0, 1} L(λ) . That is, we proved that Pr Exp j = 1 − Pr Exp j+1 = 1 ≤ is negligible for all j.
All in all, we showed Adv
AEC,A (λ) = 1 is negligible. Note that AEC preserves the unforgeability of scheme S.
As shown above, general transformation of indistinguishable signatures into pseudorandom becomes straightforward -once appropriate admissible encodings are identified. If signatures are formed by tuples of elements of certain sets then by the aggregation lemma it will suffice to identify encodings for these particular sets. Lemma 13 shows existence of admissible encodings for a variety of algebraic sets that are often used in practical cryptography, including sets behind the indistinguishable versions of FDH-RSA, Schnorr, and Boneh-Boyen schemes from Section 4.1.
Lemma 13 (Sets with Admissible Encodings).
For the following sets R there exist polynomials (λ) and admissible encodings F : {0, 1}
(λ) → R:
(1) Ranges R = {0, . . . , N − 1} = ZN of natural numbers, for arbitrary N ∈ N.
(2) The set of quadratic residues modulo safe primes p, i.e.
(3) Arbitrary subgroups Gq ⊆ Z × p of prime order q.
(4) The set R = E(F) of rational points on (certain) elliptic curves, defined over a finite field.
Proof. The set {0, 1} (λ) can be canonically identified with T (λ) := Z 2 (λ) . It will hence, for all considered sets R, suffice to indicate admissible encodings T (λ) → R. (1) Let N ∈ N be a natural number, and λ = |N | its length. Consider polynomial (λ) = 2λ, function F :
ZN ; a → a mod N , and the probabilistic mapping IF :
. It is easy to see that IF inverts F . According to [27, Section 8.8] , the statistical distance between IF (r) for r ∈R ZN and the uniform distribution in T (λ) is bounded by < N/2 (λ) ≈ 2 λ /2 2λ = 2 −λ , and hence negligible. (2) and (3) Let p = αq + 1 with primes p, q such that gcd(α, q) = 1 and |p| = λ (if α = 2 we have the safe prime setting). Let g be a generator of
As g q and also (g q ) r have order α, it is easy to see that F perfectly 'inverts' IF . The encoding is 0-admissible as for every h ∈ G we have
for some t, x, y (by CRT or Euclid), i.e. every element in G is the (unique) product of the power of an order-α and the power of an order-q element. In above construction, the role of the former is taken by (g q ) r , while element a
∈ Gq corresponds to the latter. This encoding can be composed with (1) for N = p to obtain the desired F : {0, 1}
(λ) → R. (4) We refer to Brier et al. [8] for an overview of (pairingfriendly) curves with suitable admissible encodings.
Direct PR Compiler
The PR compiler introduced below outputs pseudorandom signatures (with full key exposure) for any signature scheme S; underlying techniques were proposed in [17] for building anonymous signatures. Its main building block is a pair of associated randomness extractor E and hash function H. Here, we only recall the properties of such a pair (E, H) and refer to [17] for a rigorous treatment. Basically, a randomized hash function H takes a message m and some randomness r ∈R {0, 1} t(λ) and outputs h = H(m; r). H is called collision-intractable if it is difficult to find m = m and r ∈ {0, 1} t(λ) with H(m; r) = H(m , r), for the same randomness r. The task of the randomness extractor E is to distill uniformly distributed strings of fixed length from inputs x ← X whose distribution is unknown but where a certain minimum level of entropy is assumed. As auxiliary input, E gets a uniformly distributed randomness u ∈ {0, 1} d(λ) . The extracted value is denoted by E(m; u). A pair (E, H) is called pseudorandom if tuples (r, y, u, e) and (r, y, u, v) are computationally indistinguishable, where r ∈R {0, 1} t(λ) , y ← H(x; r), u ∈R {0, 1} d(λ) , e ← E(x; u), and v ∈R {0, 1} |e| , for x ← X . Fischlin [17] offers an efficient instantiation for such primitive in the standard model 10 . Our analysis shows 10 In the random oracle model H(x; r) := H # (0 x r) and that this primitive gives rise to the following compiler for pseudorandom signatures, which are also indistinguishable and confidential (by Lemmas 10 and 5). We notice that this compiler results in somewhat less efficient schemes as opposed to our IND-to-PR compiler (e.g. when used with our IND examples).
DPRC.KGen(1 λ ) : Output (sk, pk) ← S.KGen(1 λ ).
DPRC.Sign(sk, m) : Choose r ∈R {0, 1} t(λ) and u ∈R {0, 1} d(λ) . Let h ← H(m; r) and σ ← S.Sign(sk, h). Compute τ := σ ⊕ E(m; u) and output σ := τ r u.
DPRC.Ver(pk, m, σ ) : Parse σ as σ = τ r u. Let σ := τ ⊕ E(m; u) and h ← H(m; r). Output S.Ver(pk, h, σ).
Theorem 2. If (E, H) is a pseudorandom pair of an associated randomness extractor E and a hash function H then for any signature scheme S the DPRC signature scheme, obtained using our direct PR compiler, is pseudorandom with respect to full key exposure (in the standard model).
Proof Sketch. Anonymity of DPRC is shown in [17] by presenting a game-hopping proof that, in the first hop, modifies ANON game such that challenge signature σ * is computed as specified in DPRC, except that τ is replaced by τ := σ ⊕ v for random v ∈R {0, 1} |E(m;u)| . As v acts as a one-time pad on σ, component τ is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}
|σ| . Obviously, the concatenation σ = τ r u is uniformly distributed as well, in {0, 1} |σ|+t(λ)+d(λ) . This shows pseudorandomness of DPRC. Note that the transformed scheme inherits its unforgeability from S under standard assumptions as proven [17] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper we gave a detailed account on the privacy hierarchy for ordinary signature schemes, taking into account earlier definitions of anonymity and confidentiality in the setting of high-entropic message spaces and system-wide known public keys. Our major result are pseudorandom signatures that cannot be distinguished from random strings and thus hide the entire information about message, signer, and signing algorithm. To obtain such fully private signatures we gave two compilers: the more efficient one adds pseudorandomness to indistinguishable signature schemes and we have shown that such schemes exist in different cryptographic settings; our second compiler, based on Fischlin's work [17] , adds pseudorandomness to any unforgeable signature scheme but is less efficient (though in the standard model). In summary, with our hierarchy of privacy notions and generic transformations we showed how to efficiently achieve an ultimate form of privacy for arbitrary signature schemes, both in the random oracle and the standard model.
APPENDIX A. DEFINITION OF UNFORGEABILITY
Definition 9 (Existential Unforgeability). A signature scheme S is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) if all PPT adversaries A have negligible probability to output (m * , σ * ) ← A Sign(sk,·) (pk) (where (sk, pk) ← KGen(1 λ ) and Sign(sk, ·) is a signature oracle) such that Ver(pk, m * , σ * ) = 1, provided that m * was not queried to Sign(sk, ·) oracle.
B. PROOFS OF LEMMAS 1 AND 2
Proof of Lemma 1 (CONF[-FKE] ⇒ ANON). Let S be a confidential signature scheme. We construct a confidential but not anonymous signature scheme S from S as follows. KGen (1 λ ) : Output (sk, pk) ← KGen(1 λ ).
Sign (sk, m) : σ ← Sign(sk, m). Output σ := (σ, pk). Ver (pk, m, σ ) : Parse σ as (σ, pk ). Return 1 iff
Ver(pk, m, σ) = 1 ∧ pk = pk . As pk is extractable from σ , S is not anonymous. Yet, S is confidential (as the CONF adversary knows pk anyway).
Proof of Lemma 2 (ANON[-FKE] ⇒ CONF).
Let S be an anonymous signature scheme and L(x) denote the the last bit of x. We construct an anonymous but not confidential signature scheme S from S as follows.
KGen (1 λ ) : Output (sk, pk) ← KGen(1 λ ).
Sign (sk, m) : σ ← Sign(sk, m). Output σ := (σ, L(m)). Ver (pk, m, σ ) : Parse σ as (σ, b). Return 1 iff
Ver(pk, m, σ) = 1 ∧ L(m) = b . To see that S is not confidential, consider the following confidentiality adversary A = (A1, A2). A1 outputs ( m0, t0) (resp. ( m1, t1) ), where mi = (Mi) for Mi ∈R {0, 1}
λ , and ti = L(Mi). A2 parses σ * as σ * = ((σ, b) ) and outputs b. So Adv . To show anonymity of S , consider any adversary A = (A1, A2) against ANON of S . Flip a coin β ∈R {0, 1} and define ANON adversary B = (B1, B2) against S as follows: On input pk0, pk1, B1 runs A1(pk0, pk1) as a blackbox and receives a message m. If L(m) = β, m is output, otherwise the simulation aborts which is modeled by letting B's simulator output 0, i.e. Pr[Exp
